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Use of pricing as a means of obtaining improved utilization of trans-
portation facilities within metropolitan areas has hardly been an
outstanding success in the past and, with the increasing share of this
function now taken by the private automobile, pricing in recent years
has been pushed even further into the background. Yet, now more
than ever before, with increasingly vast sums at stake and even the
whole pattern of our metropolitan areas likely to be radically affected
by the manner in which transportation facilities are to be provided and
used, it is becoming essential that the full potentialities of the pricing
instrument be developed. That instrument is needed as a means not
only of improving utilization of existing facilities in the short run, but
also of developing the data essential to intelligent planning for new
facilities.
A number of factors conspire to distract attention from the pos-
sibilities of using pricing for these ends. One factor is the frequent
practice of discussing the subject in terms of aggregates and averages
that mask sharp differences in costs and benefits. The differences are
particularly sharp in the context of urban transportation, in that
important time peaks compound their effects with locational peaks and
with wide differences among individuals in the marginal significance
of different uses. Another factor has been the relatively high cost and
irksomeness of the methods hitherto employed for the direct pricing
of specific transportation services.In the absence of reliable data or
estimates of elasticities and cross-elasticities of demand, there has been
a tendency in transportation planning to ignore price elasticities and
to assume that past trends will continue, regardless of what might be
done with suitable pricing policies.Particularly with respect to the
pricing of roadway use, a long history of relative absence of direct
charges, plus a genuine lack of functional need of such charges for use276 PRICING AS A TOOL IN LOCAL TRANSPORTATION
of facilities with a low level of utilization and hence low marginal cost,
have tended to cause the potentialities for improvement in this direction
to be overlooked. Given only a modest amount of ingenuity, however,
it is not too much to say that few significant refinements in the pricing
of transportation are now actually beyond reach on purely mechanical
grounds.
Estimates of the costs involved in the use of urban streets and high-
ways by private automobiles vary widely. In most cases, not enough
firm data are available to pin costs down with great accuracy, but
enough is known to indicate that they can reach very high levels, and
that fairly drastic pricing procedures could be justified.G. J. Roth
(Department of Applied Economics, Cambridge, England) estimates
that an optimum tax rate to apply on the basis of traffic data for Cam-
bridge would range from 10 to 21 shillings per hour, or 7 to 22 pence
per mile. M. Bruce Johnson (University of Washington) has presented
figures suggesting that tax rates of about 5centsper mile would be
appropriate for what are vaguely described as urban arterials at levels
of traffic 75percent of "mean practical capacity," with sharply higher
rates applicable to conditions of heavier traffic.Price tags attached
to alternative plans for the Washington, D.C.,areafor 1980 indicated
that, for each additional car brought into the central business district
during the rush hour, capital investment in highway facilities, not
including parking, would tend to increase by $23,000. In Los Angeles
where, among the larger cities, conditions might be thought most
favorable for freeway construction, costs of providing for peak traffic
range from 3 to 12 cents per vehicle mile. While estimates of this kind
vary widely and are all subject to wide ranges of error, they indicate
costs sufficiently higher than vehicular charges cover to warrant serious
exploration of ways and means of bringing this cost home to the in-
dividuals whose choices of transportation patterns give rise to the
costs.
Suggestions that drivers on city streets should pay for them on the
basis of specific trips have usually been rejected out of hand on the
ground that the collection of such charges would be too costly and
would cause too much interference with the flow of traffic. Even where
tolls are collected for use of bridges, tunnels, and the like, suggestions
of adjustment of tolls according to the degree of congestion and the
time of day have been rejected, partly because of familiar and estab-
lished patterns, and partly on the ground that such variation would
tend to produce confusion causing further delays at toll-collection
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proposed for the collection of such charges, any one of which would
perform the job at modest cost and with practically no interference
with traffic flow.
One type of system would involve equipping each vehicle with an
identification unit which can be scanned by roadside equipment located
at zone boundaries so that, whenever a vehicle passed from one zone
into another, a record would be made of the identity of the vehicle
and the time. The records taken to a central data processing unit for
assembling data on particular vehicles would be the basis of billing
the owners of vehicles periodically.Bills could be readily itemized to
whatever extent the owner requested, so that, if he is a regular user of
the highways of an area, he could modify his pattern of highway use
according to the charges.In addition, current charges could be in-
dicated by roadside notices or publicized in other ways. A number
of different techniques of identification are available, some of which
are actually in use for railway, bus, and other kinds of carrier. They
include electronic response blocks energized from a scanning beam,
small code-signal transmitters connected with the car's ignition switch,
reflectorized panels scanned by photoelectric equipment, sequences of
slots in an iron bar to be scanned by radar, or photographs of modified
license plates with subsequent conversion to digital records by scanning
equipment at the central processing bureau.There should be no
difficulty in developing one or more of these methods to a satisfactory
level of reliability and at reasonable cost.
Another major type of system requires a meter on the car, in most
cases, arranged to display a signal visible from the outside to indicate
the manner in which it is functioning.In some versions, the meter
runs down at a time rate that can be varied according to traffic con-
ditions.In one form, the driver is responsible for setting the meter
to a rate indicated by wayside signals, according to time of day or
traffic conditions. A slightly more elaborate form of meter would
change the rate automatically in response to signals emitted at zone
boundaries.Another version could be a meter running down in
response to pulses or signals emitted from wayside apparatus, either
in the form of pulsed signals blanketing an area or propagated from
cables laid lengthwise in the road, or sequences of signals from cross-
wise antennae or cables. Various ways of resetting the meters can be
devised, but perhaps the simplest would be resetting them by the in-
sertion of destructible tokens purchased at service stations. Meters at
an attractively low cost have been devised in England, where pricing
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Such meters have the further advantage of adjustment to function as
parking meters;as such, they are more flexible than fixed meters
installed at the curb, in that payment is determined ex post and can be
more directly apportioned to the time the parking space is occupied.
Moreover, itis possible to vary the charge by time of day and
even permit vehicle owners, presumably at their own expense, to
attach devices which adjust the meter charging rate when a car is
left parked over periods covering more than one rate of parking
charge.
The cost of even the more expensive of such charging systems should
be only a minor sum relative to the cost of the facilities to be controlled.
Even for the systems using identification and central processing, the
capital cost of the scanning and processing equipment should not
come to more than about $20 per car for a moderately large metro-
politan area. The identification unit carried by the car may involve a
roughly comparable cost. The cost of processing and billing would be
roughly comparable to that of accounting and billing for telephone or
electric power service. Probably the greatest difficulty would be initial
and simultaneous equipment of all cars that use the streets of a par-
ticular area more or less regularly.
If granted that some such scheme is a feasible possibility, what would
it mean for the coordination of local transportation? The possibilities
are indeed far-reaching. The most obvious immediate impact to be
expected is a more economical distribution of traffic between the
various modes.The imbalance between public transit and private
automobile is much greater than would appear from a superficial
comparison of over-all costs, and introduction of a flexible pricing
system capable of differentiating between peak and off-peak usage can
accomplish more than might at first appear. The reason is that public
transit usage is much more sharply concentrated in the peak hours
than vehicular traffic is, so that if no differentiation between peak and
off-peak charges is made for either facility, public transit makes an
unduly poor showing.It could be regarded as a form of "cream
skimming" on the part of the private automobile.
In extreme cases, failure to distinguish rush-hour and non-rush-hour
traffic can completely invert the cost comparison. As a somewhat
oversimplified example, suppose a facility of type M attracts rush-hour
and non-rush-hour passengers at the ratio of ito 4, and costs $1.00 for
each rush-hour passenger provided for and 20 cents for each nonrush-
hour passenger.Suppose also the costs of facility T are uniformly
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on an over-all average basis, M has a cost of $1.00 + 4($O.20)/5
$1.80/S =$0.36;for facility T, the average cost is $.075 + $O.l5/2 =
$0.90/2=$0.45,on the assumption that for T one-half the total
traffic is rush-hour traffic.The planner pointing to that calculation
might ask why inferior transit service should be provided at a higher
cost than the preferred private automobile costs.Transit service is
cheaper, however, by 25 cents in the rush hour and 5 cents in the non-
rush hour, as appropriately differentiated charges show.If differen-
tiation by time of day is impossible, it would be desirable to have the
relative charges on the two facilities at least reflect the direction of the
specific cost differentials at the specific times. That could be done by
raising the charges on M to, say, 45 cents as compared with costs of
36 cents on the average basis, while using the excess revenues to
subsidize T and make it self-liquidating by lowering the charge to
35 from 45 cents. Ruling out special charges for peak use thus creates
an impressive argument for subsidizing public transit at the expense
of private vehicular traffic.
One effect of such charges for street use would be to change the
relative attractiveness of different forms of mass transportation. Under
present conditions, buses are often entangled in the same congestion
as private cars are and are further handicapped by their inferior ma-
neuverability. Bus service, then, is not sufficiently convenient relative
to use of private cars to attract the volume of traffic required for
satisfactory frequency of service and a desirable variety of routes.
In the absence of pricing, some form of reserved right-of-way or
priority arrangement becomes necessary. In some cases, it is possible
to provide a lane reserved exclusively for buses, but usually such a
practice encounters difficulties in dealing with intersections and pickup
points, and often leads to underutilization of the reserved lanes, since
it is seldom possible to schedule just enough bus service for a whole
lane of capacity. At best this is only a partial solution.Difficulties
with bus service sometimes provide strong arguments for the greater
expense of a rail rapid-transit system to provide higher-speed service,
even where the volume of traffic might not justify such a facility.
With Street use controlled by pricing, however, it is possible to insure
that the level of congestion be kept down to the point at which buses
will provide a satisfactory level of service.Exclusive rights-of-way,
whether reserved lanes or rapid-transit tunnels, need then be provided
only where they are genuinely warranted by the high volume of traffic.
Specific charging for street use can also provide conditions more
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as between modes. For example, much sporadic effort has been spent
on promotion of staggered working hours to relieve peak-hour con-
gestion on transportation facilities.However, except in particularly
favorable circumstances where governments or a few dominant em-
ployers agree to maintain staggered hours, exhortation seems doomed
to only partial success unless backed up by some kind of fare dif-
ferentiation. In the absence of some such mild incentive, so soon as
the peak-hour congestion is reduced to moderate levels by staggering,
individual employers and employees tend to drift back to the more
popular hours, until at least some degree of congestion is re-created.
Off-peak fare differentials, even if not sufficient of themselves to initiate
any marked degree of staggering, may prove essential to make whatever
staggering is achieved by other means stick.In the absence of dis-
criminating pricing applied to private automobiles, however, it may be
difficult to raise public transit fares significantly during peak hours
without undue increase in use of private automobiles—a situation,
worse rather than better. There are thus severe limits to what can be
done with peak—off-peak differentials in transit fares in the absence of
a corresponding degree of differentiation in highway-user charges.
Much of the coordination provided by differentiated highway charges
would be within the private-automobile mode, of course.Rapid
vehicular transportationwithincongested areas—often not now
available at any price—would be available for meeting emergency and
high-priority needs, when the cost is justified. Even in a community
where competition between mass transit and private automobiles is
not a factor, pricing of highway usage would have an important function
in coordinating the flow of highway traffic.For example, traffic
between opposite sides of town often has the choice of going right
through the center or of taking a more circuitous by-pass route—fre-
quently competitive routes, even when one or both is not of limited-
access type. Left to themselves, cross-town drivers are likely to choose
the shorter route through the center, unless it becomes so congested
that the longer way around is quicker. Pricing under such circumstances
can be of considerable help in decongesting the center and increasing
the share of traffic diverted to the relatively less congested and less
costly by-pass routes, particularly during rush hours.If pricing cannot
be used, the alternatives may be:(I) providing relatively costly and
often unsightly facilities through the business center to take care of not
only the traffic to and from the center but the through traffic as well;
(2) tolerating the persistence of sufficient congestion to discourage the
through traffic;(3) or possibly downgrading the design to makePRICING AS A TOOL IN LOCAL TRANSPORTATION 281
through trips artificially awkward, even in off-peak periods and for
traffic going only part way through the center.
In the longer run, the availability of such pricing methods might have
a fairly profound effect on city planning in general.Patterns of de-
velopment could be projected on the basis of rational use of the facil-
ities provided, rather than later distortion of plans to adjust to the
tendency toward wasteful use of the facilities. While proper pricing
of transportation services alone cannot eliminate the externalities
involved in urban land use, it can reduce them somewhat. Without
eliminating the need for zoning and other direct controls over land
use, proper pricing would diminish pressures on determination and
administration of zoning rules. improvements in externalities, other-
wise dependent on modification of zoning rules, would be absorbed
through the transportation charges.
While many economists may agree that a fairly strong prima facie
case for a sophisticated pricing scheme can be built in terms of broad
over-all patterns, as outlined above, adoption of such a scheme will not
come easily. The novelty of many of its features and the opposition
to be expected from individuals and organizations strongly committed
to the continuation of present trends are against it.Advocates of
pricing must, therefore, spell out in considerable detail what the costs
and benefits to be expected are.Such a study could be a means of
securing adoption of adequate pricing methods in places like Washing-
ton and San Francisco, where pricing seems likely to be critical in
determining the pattern of future growth. To determine more ac-
curately how far it would be useful to extend such a scheme to less
critical areas, such as Denver or Indianapolis, is also needed. The fact
that Cambridge is being seriously considered for an experimental
installation in England seems to indicate that there are at least some
who feel that the scope for pricing extends to fairly small urban com-
munities.
A more solidly based justification for sophisticated transportation
pricing can be obtained only by a fairly elaborate analysis. The data
for that are not yet available in the quantity or the form needed, though
some information on orders of magnitude is available. In principle, the
analysis would be a multistage one. The first stage would be a short-run
cost-benefit analysis at the margin in terms of existing conditions; the
second, a further short-run cost-benefit analysis in terms of conditions
that might be generated by a system of charges at appropriate short-run
levels; the third, a long-run cost-benefit analysis in terms of the road-
ways and other transportation facilities that would be needed without282 PRICING AS A TOOL IN LOCAL TRANSPORTATION
sophisticated pricing, compared with the needs indicated in the presence
of sophisticated pricing. Finally, there would have to be a cost-benefit
analysis in terms of comparing the cost of sophisticated pricing machin-
ery with the benefits to be derived through more efficient utilization of
facilities.
The basic question at the start is, given a system of transportation
facilities, what price structure is appropriate? On general welfare-
economics grounds, prima facie, the price should be made to vary as
closely as possible with the marginal cost and to be at a level at least
equal to marginal cost.The margin above marginal cost would be
influenced by a number of factors. Among those justifying a margin
of price above marginal cost are: (1) the presence of such margins in
the prices of commodities and services that compete either on the
demand side or on the consumption side of resources;(2) the fact
that excess revenues can be used to lower the rates of taxes having a
harmful effect in other sectors of the economy; and (3) the likelihood
that users of urban-highway facilities during the periods of potential
congestion are probably drawn from economic strata somewhat above
average, so that excess charges considered as taxes would be moderately
progressive in incidence. On the grounds of (3), justification of some
slight discrimination in favor of public transit and commercial vehicles
against private automobiles might be possible.
Measuring marginal cost of highway use under current conditions
is a fairly straightforward problem, although it does involve a certain
amount of evaluation of intangibles. While such items as contribution
to smog, or added irritation or expenditure of nervous energy resulting
from driving in congested traffic are extremely hard to evaluate in
monetary equivalents, they are not likely to loom large in the total.
Increases per vehicle mile in gasoline consumption, wear and tear on
the vehicle, and increases, if any, in losses due to accidents may prove
somewhat more amenable to pecuniary evaluation. The largest element
of cost in most cases is, however, the delay suffered by vehicles and
their occupants.
Measurement of the average amount of delay suffered by vehicles in
a traffic stream as a result of congestion is a fairly straightforward
procedure, given a well-defined objective and the resources for the
necessary observations.Converting it into a pecuniary measure of
cost, however, is subject to a considerable range of error.At one
extreme, time may mean very little to a rider out for "an hour's spin"
and caring little whether the hour covers fifteen miles or thirty, or to
the unemployed bus rider with too much leisure.Vehicle time mayPRICING AS A TOOL EN LOCAL TRANSPORTATION 283
also be relatively costless if the vehicle is used only for a fixed number
of trips per day—by a commuter. On the other hand, the time of the
busy executive may be worth a great deal, at least in terms of what
he would pay to accelerate his trip. A reduction in time spent in the
journey to work may be considered tantamount to a reduction in
the gross working day and can thus appropriately be valued at a rate
corresponding to the rate of take-home pay.Evaluation at the rate
of pay is even more clearly appropriate for those whose travel falls
within their working day, as truck-drivers, salesmen, taxi-drivers, or
doctors.
Such an evaluation at the rate of pay might be subject to upward
or downward adjustment according to whether the time spent in
traffic delays is considered more or less irksome than time spent on the
job. In any case, it is the average value attributable to a given traffic
mix that furnishes the basis for a charge: the joy-rider is not entitled
to escape the charge merely because he places no value on his time
at the moment. Another element to be taken into account is the
dispersion of delays. Under some circumstances, slow-moving traffic
is subject to relatively little additional delay up to a certain point, as
traffic density increases; faster-moving traffic is held up most severely.
On the whole, faster-moving traffic probably has a higher time value
than slow-moving traffic has—a reason for using a value-per-minute
of delay slightly higher than a strictly statistical average.Another
factor is the variability of trip time on different occasions.If trip
time is more unpredictable because of interruptions of flow due to
heavy traffic, or if interruptions when they do occur are more severe,
significant additional cost may be entailed in the adjustment of plans,
over and above the increase in average time lost in the traffic flow
itself.individuals may have to leave their origins much earlier in
order to be reasonably sure of catching a train, meeting an engagement,
or the like.That time would not be indicated by a comparison of
average trip times between congested and uncongested conditions.
Transit operators may have to schedule longer layovers in their sched-
ules, and passengers may have to wait longer at bus stops and transfer
points.These factors only add to the difficulty of evaluation, and
data permitting their specific evaluation are almost totally lacking.
All of this would pertain to traffic as currently observed.Also
needed is some idea of the circumstances after an equilibrium is reached,
with rates justifiable in terms of the traffic conditions generated in
response to the imposition of those rates.Here we know relatively
little about the elasticity to be expected, either in terms of substitution284 PRICING AS A TOOL IN LOCAL TRANSPORTATION
between modes, between times of day, or in terms of absolute genera-
tion or suppression of traffic. Leon Moses has made some estimates of
the amount of fare differential that would be necessary to divert pas-
sengers from automobile commuting to public transit. He estimated
that free transit riding would convert only one-third or less of the
present car commuters to public transit riding, while an increase in the
cost of car commuting by 60 cents per trip might convert about half
the automobile commuters. These figures indicate that the prospects
of doing very much by the manipulation of transit fares are very
limited. Although the assessment of charges appropriate to the costs
would not eliminate the problem, it would put a very considerable dent
in the problem of rush hour congestion.
In the longer run, there is the further problem of evaluating the
contribution of a sophisticated pricing system in the context of optimal
adjustment of the highway and transportation system to the demand,
with and without pricing.It is of course conceivable that, even though
the cost of a pricing system could be shown to be amply warranted
in terms of the short-run situation, it might be cheaper in the long run
to construct a slightly too-large highway system than to install a some-
what less costly but essentially nonproductive pricing mechanism.
But while such a situation is conceivable, it seems to be rather unlikely.
It would require that the elasticity of demand for highway usage be
very low at levels of traffic above the optimal but fairly substantial at
levels of traffic below optimal.
A complete appraisal of the desirability of pricing requires, neverthe-
less, that we not only estimate the appropriate levels of charges and
the consequences of levying them, in the short run with existing high-
way facilities, but also the appropriate levels after highway facilities
have been adjusted to an optimal level.Here, we are concerned not
merely with the short-run cost of additional traffic as measured by
costs of congestion borne by fellow motorists, but rather with equili-
brating short- and long-run costs.Long-run costs in this case are
costs of construction of additional facilities, including in appropriate
places, the opportunity cost of devoting land to this rather than to
other uses. In an optimal equilibrium, of course, the long-run marginal
cost and the short-run cost should be equal.But, since short-run
marginal cost is calculated in terms of the traffic conditions at a given
time of day, whereas long run marginal cost pertains to the effects of
expanding a facility for use throughout the year, equality can be met
only in terms of aggregating the short-run marginal cost over a year.
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traffic levels but also to at least some of the off-peak levels where the
marginal cost, though lower than during the peak, is still not negligible.
Put in another way, if an estimate is to be made of the long-run marginal
cost of peak traffic, it is necessary to credit against the cost of ex-
pansion of the facilities' capacity some allowance for benefits from such
expansion accruing to off-peak traffic.
To reduce the procedure for analyzing long-run marginal cost to
manageable proportions, we can use the constant-elasticity formula
for congestion cost, according to which the time taken to travel a
given distance is t= aqk, where t0 is the time required to travel
a given distance under conditions of very light traffic, q is the volume
of traffic in vehicles per hour and a and k are constants. The average
congestion cost experienced per vehicle is then z =t—t0=aqk,and
the marginal cost per vehicle trip is a(k+l)qk =(k+ 1)z in vehicle
hours.Long-run optimum adjustment is then reached when the
marginal cost of an addition to capacity is equal to the short-run
marginal cost aggregated over all traffic, i.e., M = + =
+ It may help to think of a "marginal cost per average
vehicle," M
which is the figure that would be obtained by dividing the cost of an
increment of capacity by the total increment of traffic provided for by
the increment of capacity at constant degree of congestion. A "peaking
factor" can then be constructed which would be the ratio of the mar-
ginal cost of peak traffic to the marginal cost per average vehicle.
Put in another way, the peaking factor would be the ratio of the pro-
portion of total marginal cost chargeable to a given volume of peak
traffic to the proportion this traffic is of the total traffic, i.e., the ratio
of the marginal cost for the peak traffic to the marginal cost averaged
over all traffic. The peaking factor can then be written,
—a(k+ —
+
The peaking factor can then be calculated from data on the distribution
of traffic flow by time of day, for any given value of k. The value of k
will of course vary, being in general lower at lower volumes of traffic
and approaching infinity as the capacity of the facility is approached.
Data available seem to show, however, that over a range of from about
60 per cent of capacity to about 95 per cent, a fixed value of k can give
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interest lies.Use of a value of k appropriate to the higher levels of
traffic, for the purpose of imputing a share of the marginal cost to the
lower levels of traffic, considerably overstates the share absorbed by
the lower levels of traffic.Since the amounts involved are in any case
very small, this is of little importance to the over-all results. Peaking
factors obtained in this way can be applied to over-all incremental
cost figures to obtain the appropriate level of charges in the long run.
Applying this method to hourly data for freeways in Los Angeles,
New York, and Philadelphia gives values for R ranging from 2.08 to
5.57, for values of k ranging from to 4.0, considering various
durations of the peak ranging from 5 hours to 15 hours per week, in
each direction.Long-range planning, however, would have to allow
for the fact that pricing would of itself tend to flatten out the peak
and thus substantially reduce the peaking factor. On the other hand,
evaluating the desirability of applying the pricing mechanism in a
given situation is in effect integrating over the interval running from
the optimal situation, without sophisticated pricing, to the optimal
situation with such pricing. The relevant peaking factor, therefore,
may be some intermediate value between that obtaining under current
conditions and that obtaining under ideal conditions, with pricing.
Evaluation of the scope for sophisticated pricing depends not only
on demand patterns—both as to degree of peakedness and price
elasticity—but also on the relative costs of the installation of the
pricing mechanism and of additions to traffic facilities. The costs of
the pricing mechanism are necessarily subject to a wide range of un-
certainty—owing to almost no relevant experience. In The Economist
for March 16, 1963, however, there is a report that a British firm has
estimated the cost of a meter for a car at from £5 to £10, which certainly
suggests the cost of sophisticated pricing is not the prime deterrent.
The meter described appears to be operated by roadside signals, and
the cost of the roadside equipment is likely to be far less in the aggregate
than the cost of the meters themselves—indicating a fairly low-cost
system. The question seems to be not so much whether a system exists
that would be worthwhile where the need is greatest, but rather whether
more highly refined and automatic systems would be worth the extra
cost.Since it would be desirable to have a single type of system in
operation in different metropolitan areas throughout the country, it
may be desirable to have a system slightly less elaborate than would be
ideal for the most severely congested metropolitan areas.
In estimating the cost of providing facilities for additional traffic,
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for freeway and expressway construction—where much recent ex-
penditure has been concentrated—than for measures designed to
increase the capacity of local Street networks.It is somewhat easier,
though still difficult, to reduce over-all costs of freeway construction
to meaningful common units of measurement.Moreover, to the
extent that expressways provide relief for local streets congested with a
large share of through traffic, that is the relevant margin.
Costs of freeway construction vary tremendously. Additions pro-
posed in January 1959 for the Maryland suburbs of Washington were
to have cost an average of $0.54 million per lane mile; lanes projected
at the same time within the District of Columbia were priced at $2.35
million per lane mile; 6.7 miles of projects in Manhatten were priced
in 1958 at $38.4 million per route mile, equivalent to at least $5 million
per lane mile (for an average of nearly eight lanes).If we assume a
charge of 4.5 per cent on the value of the right of way and 6 per cent
on construction costs for interest and amortization, and if construction
costs are two-thirds of the total, then the charges become 5.5 per cent
per year, or about $160 per million per day. Adding $17 per lane mile
per day to cover maintenance and control expenditures, we have a
daily cost per lane mile ranging from $92 (for a capital cost of $0.5
million per lane mile) to $767 for expressways costing $5 million per
lane mile.If we suppose the average daily traffic to run from 5,000
cars per lane on the cheaper facilities (average conditions on four-lane
freeways in California) to 20,000 cars per lane on the more expensive
facilities (approaching the maximum observed on six- and eight-lane
freeways), we get an average cost per vehicle mile of from 1.8 cents for
the low-cost facilities to about 3.8 cents on the more expensive facilities.
Applying relatively low peaking factors ranging from 2.0 to 3.0, we
would get a cost of peak traffic of 3.6 cents per vehicle mile on the
lowest-cost facilities, ranging up to 10.8 cents per vehicle mile on
high-cost facilities.
Of course, these are average rather than marginal costs, in that we
have not allowed for economies of scale in the construction of express-
ways. A six-lane expressway will not always cost 50 per cent more than
a four-lane facility.Alternate routes often produce economies of
scale, shortening travel distance and time for some users, plus relief
of congestion. Such economies are rapidly becoming exhausted, how-
ever, in the New York metropolitan area. We find an extra tube being
added to the Lincoln Tunnel, the Throg's Neck bridge is really not
much more than a relief for the Whitestone bridge, and expansion
is often in the form of additional lanes to existing facilities. Moreover,288 PRICING AS A TOOL IN LOCAL TRANSPORTATION
it appears that more than three lanes bring decreasing returns to scale
through increased interference with traffic getting to and from access
ramps. Costs increase, too, as the relatively less costly locations are
used up.
Enlargement of existing routes provides a concrete illustration of
the premature expansion that may be required in the absence of suitable
pricing. The scheme of commutation rates for the Lincoln Tunnel
actually encouraged a type of traffic concentrated in the peak hours.
If the Port of New York Authority had been willing to experiment
with a more rational toll structure, postponement of construction of
the third tube might have proved desirable.If, for example, the entire
annual toll charges incurred as a result of the construction of the third
tube were apportioned among users that could not be accommodated
on the existing two tubes, selecting for this purpose the users having
the least intensive demand at each time of day, the charges might have
been too high for those users.If so, it would have been better to
dispense with construction of the third tube, adjusting tolls to restrict
traffic to the capacity of the existing tubes. Of course, given the political
constitution of the Authority, charges of exploitation and failure to
cater to the demands of the public would have arisen.Use of the
excess revenues to provide better alternative transit service, however,
would certainly have been worth considering. On the other hand, given
an inability to adjust tolls as described, construction of the tunnel may
have been preferable to toleration of the existing facilities.
For local streets of downtown areas, the evaluation of long-run
marginal cost is much more difficult; indeed it may be impossible to
arrive at meaningful figures.The long run, in the strict sense, is
longer than the life of the planners, and determining the optimal street
layout (starting from scratch) is only an interesting intellectual exercise
with but remote implications for even longest-range policy.Costs of
occasional street-widening or -straightening projects should be a stern
reminder that, in certain directions, the opportunity cost of street
space is very high. At the other extreme, urban redevelopment often
involves closing streets and creation of superbiocks.Almost every
case appears to be sul generis, giving little guidance for long-run ex-
pectations. Perhaps costs of local street use in downtown areas may
be alleviated in the long run by the competition of expressways pene-
trating close to the center and siphoning off some traffic from local
streets.
Arguments against meaningful charges for city-street use are often
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should be roughly equal, and that average cost can be computed on
the basis of actual cash outlays for city street construction and main-
tenance.Charges for a rental value of the space occupied by the
streets is dismissed as either already funded through allocation of the
street space to public use, or on the ground that the value of the street
area is reflected in the market and tax value of the adjacent property.
Let us explore in an academic vein the opportunity cost of devoting
an additional quantum of land to transportation use rather than to the
support of a business activity.
In a Von ThUnen-LOsch type of model of spatial economics, every
commodity or service has a well-defined shadow price at every point
in the space, prices which never differ from one point to another by
more than their cost of transport. Firms locate at points where the
relation between factor and product prices is most favorable, where
there is no cross-haul, and site rents reflect transportation-cost dif-
ferentials for a firm located at any given point as compared to the next
best location for the firm.In such a model, generally, abstracting a
piece of land from existing use will cause an increase in transportation
cost in conjunction with the displaced activity. The cost can be meas-
ured by the amount of rent necessary to bid the land away from the
particular use. In such a model, the opportunity cost of land in a given
location for use in providing transportation facilities could be deter-
mined on the basis of the market rent of the land.
Actual cities are very far from this rational pattern, however. In
many economic relationships, prices tend to be blanketed over an
area, costs of transportation being borne now by the seller, now by the
buyer, or sometimes shared in a rather uncertain manner. A great
deal of cross-hauling goes on, most importantly perhaps in moving
labor;great numbers of people with comparable skills pass each
other going in opposite directions, in cases those living near the
center of the city work in the suburbs. A firm contemplating a move
from a low-rent location A to a high-rent location B (or vice versa)
is likely to compare the rent differential with the saving in that portion
of the transportation costs which is likely to be borne by the firm;
this change is likely to be substantially less than the total change in
transportation costs resulting from the movement of the firm. In the
extreme case of a completely blanketed market and equal sharing of
transportation costs between shipper and consignee (or between em-
ployer and employee, etc.), the firm would tend to take into account
only one-half the saving in total transportation costs in moving from
A to B. As a result, the rent differential is likely to be bid up only to290 PRICING AS A TOOL IN LOCAL TRANSPORTATION
half the level that would fully reflect these transportation costs.This
fact may be considered as the essence of what is sometimes vaguely
referred to as the external economies of the central business district.
If all businesses have roughly the same ratio of area to transpor-
tation requirements, the result would not be serious; the only deviation
from theory is that rents would be lower than they should be theoret-
ically. To the extent that businesses differ, there will be some mal-
distribution of business with reference to the minimum transport
locations, but the deviations do not seem to be highly systematic.
If one business attempts to bid land away from another at the center
of the city, the expectation would be—barring wide differences in their
transportation requirements—a rough balance between the resulting
increase in transportation costs for one business and decreases for the
other. (In neither case, however, would all these changes be borne by the
firms changing locations.) When space at the center is taken over for
transportation purposes and the firm formerly occupying that space is
forced to move to the periphery, total costs of the transportation services
required by that firm will go up by more than the saving on rent, some
of them being shifted to customers and suppliers of the firm. To justify
the change for the city, the reduction in costs of transportation resulting
from use of more space for it must be substantially greater than the
rent the city paid to bid the space away from the firm. Not only would
it be proper, then, to charge users of transportation rent for the space
utilized equivalent to the rent the space would command if put to
commercial use, but actually more than this—in the limiting case of
random interrelationships, twice as much.
A city cannot afford to charge nothing for use of central city streets
on the ground that they perform an access function, paid for by owners
of abutting property in property rents and taxes.It is inappropriate
to levy specific charges for use of rural and suburban access streets;
but this is because the low level of traffic makes negligible the marginal
cost of increased traffic, and not because of an access function. A
drawback in charging for use of congested access facilities through
property and other taxes is lack of creation of incentive to economize
in the use of the congested facility—changing the hours of use, or
shifting to a less competitive location for access.
Other proposed methods of pricing to coordinate urban transpor-
tation—among them, parking fees, cordon tolls,special licensing
arrangements, and others—fail to reach the core of the problem.Its
solution depends on provision of a direct incentive to the individual
driver to economize in the use of high-cost facilities during periods ofPRICING AS A TOOL IN LOCAL TRANSPORTATION 291
peak demand and potential congestion. As competition of the private
automobile with other forms of urban transportation increases, a
rational solution to the pricing of other competing modes depends on
adoption of more rational pricing procedures for the private auto-
mobile. Without an adequate solution in this area, no fully satisfactory
solution in the other areas is possible.
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COMMENT
HAROLD BARGER, Columbia University
William Vickrey throws down a double challenge: to the engineers
and to the politicians.He asks the engineers to devise a plan for
metering the use of city streets and he wishes to persuade the politicians
to accept what must at best be a complicated and unfamiliar proposal.
It seems a pity to opt for these complexities until it is shown that more
conventional methods will not achieve the desired result. We have
made a beginning with parking meters, but surely tariffs are not nearly
high enough. We can tax cars by length and width—the relevant
variables—rather than by weight.Instead of subsidizing parking
garages, we can tax them. We can levy substantial tolls at the entrances
and exits to cities.Finally, if the insurance companies can identify
cars used in cities in order to impose higher premiums, city governments
equally should be able to levy special taxes on them. The proceeds
could be used to subsidize commuter railroads, and even buses and
taxicabs.Until measures such as these have proved ineffective,it
would appear premature to embrace the complexities of an electronic
plan for metering automobile use of city streets.292 PRICING AS A TOOL IN LOCAL TRANSPORTATION
BRITTON HARRIS, University of Pennsylvania
It is difficult to find any basic point of disagreement with Vickrey's
analysis, as far as it goes. The fundamental principles of allocation of
resources which he espouses are, quite clearly, economically sound.
Considerable wind could be generated discussing his proposed methods
of collecting tolls for highway utilization and his illustrative examples
of facility costs.I propose rather to take these details as largely il-
lustrative, with the qualification that the analysis and planning of
transportation systems within the metropolitan system is substantially
more subtle and complicated than Vickrey has suggested. I will explore
certain other implications of Vickrey's position which he has, I feel,
not treated adequately.
It is by no means clear that Vickrey's proposed policy would have the
effects which he seems to seek. The collection of increased user charges
for costly and high-grade transportation facilities would, he implies,
result in a reduction in the use of these facilities because of the elasticity
of demand. Such elasticity is perhaps less than imagined; but more
important, any reduction of the utilization of a congested highway
facility results in an improvement in the service offered by the facility,
and consequently tends to restore demand to previous levels.if,
following Vickrey's rigorously economic line of thought, we then
extend the construction of such facilities to provide a new level of
service until marginal revenue equals marginal cost, the result might
be a highway system substantially more extensive than is presently con-
templated in most urban areas.
This situation arises because we are presently allocating funds to
urban highway construction only up to the point of rather high benefit-
cost ratios.Vickrey implies that benefit-cost calculations should be
converted into revenue-cost calculations.If, however, revenues are
made to equal benefits, if there has been any realism in our benefit-cost
analyses, and if these analyses become a guide to investment, it seems
likely that Vickrey might be disappointed in the results.
in the Conference discussion following the above remarks, Vickrey
conditionally acquiesced to the foregoing, stating that if this came to
pass, he would accept such a verdict of consumer choice.Such ac-
quiescence displays that curious stoicism of economists, who are willing
to sacrifice personal values, however derived, in defense of a logical
position. As an addendum to my discussion at the Conference, let me
add a brief extension of my earlier remarks which suggest a way out
of this dilemma. In placing his reliance on cost-revenue relationshipsPRICING AS A TOOL IN LOCAL TRANSPORTATION 293
for transportation alone, Vickrey isexploring the local optimum
which may be reached from present metropolitan arrangements. New
arrangements and new combinations of factors may have the effect of
substantially reducing urban travel demands. The existence, the costs,
and the benefits of such arrangements are difficult to establish, and no
market for them exists which is comparable to and carries the same
conviction as the market for transportation services in which people
trade daily. Even more difficult to evaluate are the external effects on
neighborhoods and urban life in general of any large program of
construction of transportation facilities.These externalities are not
negligible and are not excluded from an economic evaluation of the
costs of transportation.It is therefore imperative that economists
make some contribution to the valuation of such important conse-
quences of metropolitan transportation development—consequences
for which, again, no market exists.
MARTIN WOHL, Harvard University
There are many aspects in this paper worthy of discussion, if for no
other reason than because they are so often misunderstood.Initially,
one must be critical of the fashion in which Professor Vickrey has
dealt with the problem of identifying and specifying the objective
function; even a perfunctory reading of his paper reveals situations
where he is anything but precise and where he intermixes social and
economic objectives in a purely subjective fashion. For example, in
his discussion of staggered working hours as a means of relieving peak
hour congestion, he notes:"Off-peak fare differentials, even if not
sufficient of themselves to initiate any marked degree of staggering, may
prove essential to make whatever staggering is achieved by other means
stick." Obviously Vickrey at least implies that even though economic
(or social) gains of reduced congestion to riders are not sufficient to
compensate them for whatever losses they must endure as a result of
staggered hours, this free choice should be disallowed.
In another place, Vickrey states that it is justifiable to set prices above
marginal costs in some situations and that "excess revenues can be
used to lower the rates of taxes having a harmful effect in other sectors
of the economy." Also, he comments that "the likelihood [is] that
those using urban highway facilities during the periods of potential
congestion are probably on the whole drawn from economic strata
somewhat above average, so that excess charges considered as taxes
would be moderately progressive in incidence," and ends by stating that
"on this last ground it would probably be possible to justify some slight294 PRICING AS A TOOL IN LOCAL TRANSPORTATION
discrimination in favor of transit and commercial vehicles against
private automobiles."Purely aside from the fact that he almost
certainly is incorrect in his basic assumption about relative rider-income
characteristics, it should be evident that he again is terribly imprecise,
judgmental, and subjective in assessing the wisdom of quasi value-of-
service pricing and certain income transfers.
More importantly, I should like to comment on his numerical
example of rush-hour and non-rush-hour costing and pricing, and on
his proposed technique for assessing peak-hour marginal costs.




Ratio of rush-hour passenger volume to 1f4 1/1
non-rush-hour passenger volume
Cost per rush-hour passenger trip ($) 1.00 0.75
Cost per non-rush-hour passenger trip ($) 0.20 0.15
Average over-all cost per passenger trip ($) 0.36 0.45
Drawing upon these numbers, Vickrey then states,
If differentiation by time of day is impossible, it would be desirable to have
the relative charges on the two facilities at least reflect the direction of the
specific cost differentials at the specific times. That could be done by raising
the charges on M to, say, 45 cents as compared with costs of 36 cents on the
average basis, while using the excess revenues to subsidize T and make it
self-liquidating by lowering the charge to 35 from 45 cents. Ruling out special
charges for peak use thus creates an impressive argument for subsidizing
transit at the expense of vehicular traffic.
That this example and Vickrey's conclusion are absurd should be
evident. First, it is clear that differential pricing can easily and cheaply
be instituted on transit services; such a scheme would probably divert
some peak hour riders to auto (in the absence of differential pricing
for autos), would probably permit transit system economies, gain
considerable off-peak riders, and reduce unit costs on two counts.
But this is the point; years ago transit use during off-peak hours was
high, just as the auto today, and the average over-all price and cost for
transit was not only low but considerably lower than auto.(In fact,
the price of transit service is still usually lower than auto—in spite of
Vickrey's assumed numbers—because of transit subsidies of one sort
or another.)And despite the lower price of transit travel, many
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theyare shifting simply because of service differentials, and because of
their ability and willingness to afford higher-quality service.
The absence of any discussion by Vickrey regarding service offerings
or differentials leads one to assume either that he presumes that there
are no service differentials (a ridiculous case) or that he presumes that
the objective of the transportation expert is to move passenger volumes
at the lowest total cost irrespective of the service level and aside from
questions of demand and value of higher service.
Furthermore, the volume and cost data used for this example (as
well as that applied in the peaking factor examples) can hardly be
described as typical, and thus useful for drawing such general con-
clusions as Vickrey did.Briefly, the modal data which were compared
are not equivalent with respect to quality of service, volume, origin-
destination pattern, and so forth; thus, the assumed set of ratios and
costs was not internally consistent.
As for the proposed technique for determining marginal costs for
peak and off-peak travelers, a number of comments are in order.
Vickrey states: "Here, we are concerned not merely with the short-
run cost of additional traffic as measured by costs of congestion borne
by fellow motorists, but rather with equilibrating short- and long-run
costs.Long-run costs in this case are costs of construction of addi-
tional facilities, including in appropriate places, the opportunity cost
of devoting land to this rather than to other uses.En an optimal
equilibrium, of course, the long-run marginal cost and the short-run
cost should be equal."Thus, he recommends that system capacity
be expanded until (aggregated) marginal congestion costs are equal
to marginal construction costs, a point of mutual agreement.
However, his technique for allocating the construction costs of
additional capacity to peak-hour and off-peak-hour users does con-
siderable violence to this economic precept.Briefly, he derives a
"peaking factor" which is supposed to (but does not) represent the
ratio of marginal construction costs for peak-hour users to the mar-
ginal construction costs for all users, and which is then to be applied
to the average construction cost for all users to determine the price
for peak-hour travelers,itis important, though, that the peaking
factor which Vickrey developed (and which he then applied to some
numerical examples in a later section) was based entirely on congestion
costs rather than on construction costs.
To be more explicit, Vickrey defined the peaking factor as the mar-
ginal congestion cost for peak-hour travelers divided by the sum of
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facility.Since marginal construction costs and marginal congestion
costs (for a particular facility) are not necessarily equal at all output
or volume levels, this congestionpeakingfactor of Vickrey's bears
no necessary relationship to the incidence of construction costs.As
a consequence, Vickrey's peaking factor technique for allocating
construction costs and setting peak and off-peak prices (to recover
construction costs) can at best only be termed an approximate value-
of-servicepricing technique rather than a cost-of-service pricing
technique.
The technique would be approximate, if for no other reason than
that Vickrey, in developing his peaking factor, has implicitly assumed
that congestion cost varies directly with travel time, and thus as
travel time (on a particular facility) increases exponentially with
traffic volume, so does congestion cost.This assumption is subject
to considerable doubt.
In summary, one must support Vickrey in his efforts to improve the
utilization of urban transportation facilities through the development
of better pricing tools and mechanisms. At the same time, though, one
cannot help but be apprehensive on examining the material presented,
its technical inaccuracies, and the somewhat subjective and rather
biased attitude about the use and application of these tools. In short,
Vickrey has not presented differential pricing principles and techniques
properly or without regard to the outcome, but has seemingly used
them to achieve certain unsupported social objectives.Further, he
uses volumes, volume ratios, unit costs, and other related numbers in
his examples which are at best atypical and thus improper for arriving
at the conclusions which then follow. And, finally, I am most critical
of his failure to properly account for service differentials in examining
the relative cost structure and implications for auto and transit travel
and for continually referring to the development of pricing tools for
long-term objectives while using factors, volume and cost data based
on existing and not necessarily optimum facilities and services.